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LOCAL LABOR MARKETS AND
THE FEDERAL EARNED INCOME
TAX CREDIT
Andrew Hanson and Zackary Hawley
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

T

he Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which offers
relief from federal income-tax payments for a targeted group of taxpayers, is based on national income
limits and the presence of dependent children. Benefits determinations are made with a flat national maximum
level of assistance. The EITC is extended to nearly 29 million families and costs the U.S. Treasury about $64 billion
annually.
While the EITC uses national parameters to determine eligibility and benefits, the U.S. labor force is dispersed among a
series of disparate labor markets in metropolitan areas. Each
market within each geography has unique characteristics,
with vastly different wage distributions and costs of living. The unique characteristics of local labor markets make
the unyielding nature of a national EITC far less effective
to induce labor-force changes in high-cost areas, and much
more effective in low-cost areas.
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In this paper, we demonstrate that, while 20 percent of U.S.
residents claim the EITC, the rate of claims differs vastly by
metro area. EITC claim rates range from 5.5 percent in Los
Alamos, New Mexico, to more than 50 percent in Rio Grande
City, Texas. A primary contributor to these differentials is
the difference in the credit’s real value across areas with different costs of living. The real value of the maximum EITC
for a single taxpayer with one child ranges from $4,131 in
Harlingen, Texas, to $1,531 in New York City.
The EITC’s national income limits for eligibility and its
phase-out range induce varying labor-market incentives
across markets with different wage distributions. The
national parameters treat similar workers differently when
they live in different areas. Consider a typical single parent
working as a dishwasher in San Francisco; she will be subject
to the phase-out of benefits after working 1,688 hours, while
that same dishwasher in Brownsville, Texas won’t face this
tax until working 2,190 hours.
Adjusting the value of the EITC for local labor-market
and cost-of-living conditions would provide a way to target credit expansion to the most needy and induce a larger
labor-market response. Changing the EITC to adjust for real
purchasing-power differences could be set to maximize the
policy’s employment impact across labor markets by reducing implicit marginal tax rates. Our simulations show that,
to induce a 6-percentage-point increase in the labor-forceparticipation rate of eligible taxpayers, the maximum EITC
for single parents in New York City would need to be $9,905,
while a credit of $5,897 would induce the same response in
Memphis, Tennessee.

INTRODUCTION
Since its inception 40 years ago, the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) has provided tax relief to America’s working
poor. While the policy’s details have changed over the years
– in terms of how it works, who receives benefits and how
large those benefits are – the EITC is viewed widely as an
effective approach to fight poverty and expand employment
opportunities.
This paper, which examines the federal EITC’s current iteration, has four central findings:
1.

At the national level, 20 percent of taxpayers benefit from the EITC, with an average tax reduction of
$2,371. There are wide disparities in benefits across
metropolitan areas, with claim rates ranging from 5.5
percent in Los Alamos, New Mexico, to more than 50
percent in Rio Grande City, Texas. Claim-rate differentials are strongly related to city-level poverty, family size, employment and local cost of living.

2.

Cost-of-living differences across U.S. metropolitan
areas create vast differences in the real value of the
EITC. For a single taxpayer with one child, that value
ranges from $4,131 in Harlingen, Texas, to $1,531 in
New York City.

3.

The EITC’s national income limits generate differing
labor-market incentives for similar workers in different metropolitan areas. The typical single parent
working as a dishwasher in San Francisco will be subject to credit reductions after working 1,688 hours,
while that same dishwasher in Brownsville, Texas,
won’t face this tax until he or she has worked 2,190
hours.

4.

Model simulations show that, to induce a 6-percentage-point increase in the labor-force participation
rate among eligible taxpayers, the EITC would need
to be vastly different across metro areas. For single
parents in New York City, it would take a credit of
$9,905 to induce the same response as a $5,897 credit
would in Memphis, Tennessee.

Policymakers on both sides of the political aisle have been
outspoken supporters of EITC expansion, but there remains
disagreement on the type of expansion that would be most
effective in boosting employment and reducing poverty. The
two most common approaches to transforming the EITC are
to expand the size of the maximum-available credit (especially for childless workers) or change the rate of the credit
to make work more rewarding (especially in the “phase-out”
region). Each of these policies has merit, but each fails to
account for how the EITC interacts with the local nature of
labor markets.
Among the vast differences in U.S. labor markets, none are
more striking than the relative value of an earned dollar. A
dollar earned in Cleveland would have only about 45 cents
of purchasing power in Manhattan; a $30,000 salary in San
Francisco is equivalent to earning barely more than $16,000
in Omaha, Nebraska.
Despite these vast differences in real purchasing power
across labor markets, the federal EITC has strict national
parameters that do not adjust for local labor-market conditions. For example, the current maximum credit for taxpayers with one dependent child is set by statute at $3,359.
Across U.S. metropolitan areas, the real purchasing power
of that credit ranges from slightly more than $1,500 to more
than $4,100. These differences result in the policy having
uneven impacts across labor markets. The EITC has little
impact to induce employment in high-cost areas but a large
positive impact in low-cost metros.
Making cost-of-living adjustments to the EITC could provide
a more targeted way to expand the credit to those in greater
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TABLE 1: FEDERAL EITC SCHEDULE
Taxpaxer

Phase-in rate
(%)

Income level,
phase-in ends ($)

Max credit ($)

Income level, phaseout begins ($)

Phase-out
rate (%)

Income level, credit
exhausted ($)

Single, no
children

7.65

6,580

503

8,240

7.65

14,820

Single, 1 child

34.00

9,880

3,359

18,110

15.98

39,131

Single, 2
children

40.00

13,870

5,548

18,110

21.06

44,454

Single, 2+
children

45.00

6,242

18,110

21.06

47,747

Married, no
children

7.65

6,580

503

13,760

7.65

20,340

Married, 1 child

34.00

9,880

3,359

23,630

15.98

44,651

Married, 2
children

40.00

13,870

5,548

23,630

21.06

49,974

Married, 2+
children

45.00

13,870

6,242

23,630

21.06

53,267

13,870

Source: Internal Revenue Service and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities

need with the worst labor-market attachments. The credit
could be adjusted to increase fairness, maximize the policy’s
employment impact across labor markets and reduce problems of welfare migration and increasing marginal tax rates.

POLICY BACKGROUND
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which offers relief
from federal income-tax payments for a targeted group of
taxpayers, is based on national income limits and the presence of dependent children. It is a refundable credit – that is,
if the size of the credit creates negative tax liability, a recipient is eligible to receive that payment. There are four basic
components to the credit:
1.

A “phase-in” range, in which every dollar of additional earned income is supplemented by a percentagebased tax benefit;

2.

A nationally set maximum credit that can be awarded;

3.

An income level at which the credit begins to be
removed (“phased-out”), with a corresponding
phase-out rate; and

4.

An income level at which the credit is completely
exhausted.

in 1975 as an offset to Social Security taxes for low-income
workers. It has grown since then into one of the primary
ways the federal government works to combat poverty.1 Over
the past 40 years, the federal EITC has undergone several
expansions to increase the size of credit, change eligibility,
expand income limits, reduce fraud and improve incentives.
Currently, the EITC is extended to nearly 29 million families
and costs the U.S. Treasury about $64 billion2 annually.

DISTRIBUTION OF EITC BENEFITS ACROSS U.S.
CITIES
Nationally, about 20 percent of tax filers receive some benefit
from the ETIC, with an average tax reduction of $2,371. Both
the share of tax filers and the average benefit differ widely
across the country. The metro area with the highest percentage of taxpayers who benefit from the EITC is Rio Grande
City, Texas, with more than 51 percent receiving at least
some tax reduction. Demonstrating the degree of variation
across metros, Los Alamos, New Mexico has the lowest percentage of taxpayers who benefit from the EITC, at just 5.5.
The average tax reduction from the EITC also varies, but
not by nearly as much as the claim rate. The largest average
tax reduction from the EITC is found in Zapata, Texas, at
more than $3,400. The smallest is in Breckenridge, Colorado,
where the average reduction is just $1,400.

The generosity of the credit and income parameters vary
with the worker’s tax status and number of dependent children, according to the schedule in Table 1:

Local labor market conditions, demographics and cost of
living all play roles in driving these differences across met-

The EITC is designed to create an incentive for tax filers
to enter and maintain attachment to the labor force, while
providing a cash transfer to boost incomes. The policy began

1. Jonathan B. Forman, “Earned Income Tax Credit,” The Encyclopedia of Taxation
and Tax Policy, 2nd edition, eds. Joseph Cordes, Robert Ebel and Jane Gravelle, Urban
Institute Press, Washington D.C., 2005.
2. This figure includes $61 billion of direct outlays and $3 billion in lost tax revenue.
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ropolitan areas. Generally, poorer areas show higher claim
rates and larger claims, especially in areas with larger
average family size. Table 2 shows EITC claim rates and average claims for select large metropolitan areas.
TABLE 2: EITC CLAIMS IN REPRESENTATIVE LARGE METROS
City

Claim rate (%)

Avg savings ($)

Chicago

17.16

2,448

Columbus, Ohio

15.29

2,136

Denver

14.45

2,154

Houston

21.68

2,612

Indianapolis

18.97

2,374

Los Angeles

21.00

2,319

Memphis, Tenn.

30.08

2,861

New York

18.84

2,312

Orlando, Fla.

25.92

2,543

Philadelphia

16.37

2,270

Phoenix

19.66

2,487

San Antonio

24.17

2,541

San Francisco

11.51

1,933

Washington

12.84

2,212

United States

19.62

2,371

Source: IRS SOI 2013 data. Authors’ calculations. Metro areas are defined
by U.S. Census Bureau’s Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs), which comprise counties. Percent of tax filers and tax savings are values from 2013
IRS ZIP Code files, aggregated to metropolitan areas using ArcGIS.

The table demonstrates the heterogeneity in ETIC benefits;
the EITC claim rate in Orlando, Florida, is nearly double that
of Washington, while Memphis, Tennessee’s rate is nearly
triple that of San Francisco. The tax savings from the EITC
show less variation, as most metro areas are within a few
hundred dollars of the national average, but the average
claim in Memphis is 50 percent larger than in San Francisco.
A general geographical trend is that higher claim rates and
dollars claimed are found in the Southeast and Texas, while
lower claim amounts and rates are found in the rest of the
country, particularly the Northeast and San Francisco.
As seen in Table 3, smaller metropolitan areas display a much
higher degree of variation in both claim rates and average
tax savings than larger cities. The claim rate in Brownsville,
Texas is nearly four times the claim rate in Stamford, Connecticut. Some modest-income small cities (like Peoria,
Illinois) have few beneficiaries from the EITC, while others (like Tupelo, Mississippi) have claim rates near 30 percent. The tax-savings differences are wider in small cities as
well, with the average claim differing by more than $1,000
between Madison, Wisconsin and Brownsville, Texas.
To further examine the cause of EITC benefit differences
across metropolitan areas, we use a multifactor model to
describe differences between metro areas and determine

TABLE 3: EITC CLAIMS IN REPRESENTATIVE SMALL METROS
City

Claim rate (%)

Avg savings ($)

Bellingham, Wash.

14.22

1,885

Brownsville, Texas

43.88

3,072

Chapel Hill, N.C.

17.82

2,325

Dayton, Ohio

26.09

2,435

Fairbanks, Alaska

13.40

2,112

Flagstaff, Ariz.

19.79

2,118
2,476

Hilton Head, S.C.

19.48

Idaho Falls, Idaho

22.34

2,401

Madison, Wis.

10.84

1,904

Peoria, Ill.

16.65

2,347

Pueblo, Colo.

24.23

2,336

Stamford, Conn.

11.92

2,147

Tupelo, Miss.

29.20

2,533

Winston-Salem, N.C.

22.04

2,393

United States

19.62

2,371

Source: IRS SOI 2013 data. Authors’ calculations. Metro areas are defined
by U.S. Census Bureau’s Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs), which
comprise counties. Percent of tax filers and tax savings are values from
2013 IRS ZIP Code files, aggregated to metropolitan areas using ArcGIS.
Stamford, Conn. includes Bridgeport and Norwalk, Conn. Chapel Hill, N.C.
includes Durham, N.C. Brownsville, Texas includes Harlington, Texas.

how they relate to EITC claim-rate differences. The m
 odel
examines four basic factors: cost of living; labor-market conditions (employment); poverty; and family demographics
(household size). The full model is described in the appendices. These factors were chosen because they represent
both factors that make the EITC more generous (poverty,
and household size), and less generous (cost of living and
employment). The basic model shows that all four factors are
strongly associated with EITC claim rates, in both a statistical and economic sense.
Higher poverty rates are associated with higher EITC claims
in a metro area. Since the EITC is targeted to lower-income
individuals, a greater percentage of low earners implies more
EITC claims. The model shows that, while this association is
particularly strong, the correlation is not one to one. For a 10
percent increase in the poverty rate, EITC claims jump by 3.7
percent in metropolitan areas. Family size also is positively
related to EITC claims. The EITC is more generous for larger
families, making it more likely to induce work among that
group. In our sample, a 10 percent increase in the average
family size relates to a 13 percent increase in the population
that claims federal EITC benefits.
The relationship between local employment rates and
EITC claims is not as straightforward. A recipient must be
employed to claim the EITC, so one might expect a positive relationship between the two. On the other hand, a
metro with high employment rates signals a robust labor
market, likely to have more jobs that pay in excess of EITC
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FIGURE 1: COST OF LIVING BY LARGE METRO AREA

SOURCE: The Council for Community and Economic Research. Authors’ calculations.

income limits. The latter factor dominates the data, as h
 igher
employment rates are associated with lower EITC claim
rates. This relationship is quite strong at the metro area level,
with a 10 percent increase in the employment rate associated
with an 8.5 percent decline in EITC claims.
Finally, our model shows a strong negative relationship
between an area’s cost of living and EITC claims. For a 10
percent increase in the cost of living, EITC claims fall by
7.5 percent. At first glance, this relationship may seem puzzling: if goods and services are more expensive, wouldn’t it
behoove the less fortunate to claim the EITC? Unfortunately, the EITC’s design as a one-size-fits-all national program
severely alters its effectiveness across areas with different
cost and compensation structures, a topic explained further
in the next section.

COST OF LIVING AND THE EITC
The cost to feed a family in Boston is 53 percent higher than
it is in Jackson, Tennessee, but the federal EITC does not
recognize that difference when determining the tax break
applied to workers in each of those cities. The policy imposes
a national maximum on the total applicable EITC, and for
each income bracket that determines credit eligibility. This
results in real differences in how much benefit the credit creates for poor families in differing local labor markets.
A similar point can be made about any federal policy that

imposes national limits on programs whose impacts vary
greatly across different markets. The authors previously
made this point about the minimum wage and its impact on
employment loss across different states with different preexisting wage distributions in a 2014 paper for the Journal
of Labor Research.3 The relevance of a national maximum
on the EITC is magnified because it is targeted at those for
whom a small difference in the credit may constitute a large
share of income. Its importance also has grown as the EITC
has become the primary anti-poverty tool deployed at the
federal level.
Figure 1 highlights the vast differences in the cost of living
across U.S. metropolitan areas.4 Not surprisingly, the most
expensive are in the major cities of the Northeast and coastal California. There are pockets of higher-cost areas dotted
throughout the country – including Miami; Portland, Oregon; Seattle; and Minneapolis. But most of the country, and
particularly the Southeast and Texas, are mostly composed
of lower cost-of-living metro areas.
These cost-of-living differences transform the EITC from
a uniform federal policy to one that has drastically different real value to the working poor across the country. Real
3. Andrew Hanson and Zackary Hawley, “The $10.10 Minimum Wage Proposal: An
Evaluation across States,” Journal of Labor Research, 35(4), pp. 323–345, 2014.
4. All cost-of-living data come from the Council for Community and Economic
Research. Appendix II describes how cost-of-living calculations are made across
metropolitan areas.
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value differences in the spending power generated by the
flat national maximum credit imply that it is less effective
at inducing the intended positive response to look for work.
This response can be broken down into two pieces:
1.

2.

The maximum EITC at the federal level is set nationally. This affects the credit’s real value in terms of
what a recipient can purchase. The same nominal
credit dollar will induce fewer people to seek work
in high-cost cities and more people to seek work in
low-cost cities.
EITC income limits also are set at the federal level. A
worker in a high-cost city may be rendered ineligible
for the EITC, despite having the same standard of living (real wages, after adjusting for cost of living) as a
similar worker in a low-cost city.

Tables 4 and 5 show how the real value of the national maximum credit differs by local cost of living. Nationally, the maximum credit ranges between $503 (for single taxpayers) to
$6,242 (for taxpayers with three dependent children). These
dollar amounts are updated annually to reflect general price
inflation, but they are not adjusted to reflect local differences
in the buying power the maximum credit affords.
Consider that the $5,548 maximum federal credit for a family with two children is worth only $2,529 in New York City,
but $6,523 in Memphis, equivalent to 2.5 times the purchasing power. While the difference between New York and
Memphis might be extreme, there are a wide range of metro
areas where the cost of living significantly erodes the value of the EITC relative to the median cost of living in the
United States. EITC recipients in Philadelphia, Los Angeles,
San Francisco and Washington all lose more than a $1,000 in
the real value of the maximum credit, a not inconsequential
amount for the working poor in these areas.
At the same time, the residents of some metros enjoy a boon,
because the maximum credit is worth more in real purchasing power. Several cities have more than an extra $500 in real
purchasing terms, including Indianapolis, San Antonio and
Columbus, Ohio. Geographically, the credit’s value is par-

TABLE 4: COL-ADJUSTED VALUE OF MAX CREDIT IN REPRESENTATIVE LARGE METROS ($)

City

Number of children
Zero

One

Two

Three

New York*

229.32

1,531.41

2,529.39

2,845.80

San Francisco

312.86

2,089.27

3,450.80

3,882.46

Washington

360.77

2,409.23

3,979.28

4,477.05

Los Angeles

387.39

2,586.98

4,272.87

4,807.36

Philadelphia

416.29

2,779.94

4,591.58

5,165.94

Chicago

438.14

2,925.86

4,832.59

5,437.10

Denver

484.52

3,235.59

5,344.17

6,012.68

By Statute

503.00

3,359.00

5,548.00

6,242.00

Houston

509.22

3,400.51

5,616.56

6,319.13

Orlando, Fla.

523.74

3,497.50

5,776.76

6,499.37

Phoenix

526.16

3,513.63

5,803.41

6,529.35

Indianapolis

548.95

3,665.83

6,054.79

6,812.19

San Antonio

568.84

3,798.66

6,274.18

7,059.02

Columbus

578.78

3,865.06

6,383.85

7,182.41

Memphis, Tenn.

591.36

3,949.05

6,522.57

7,338.48

SOURCE: Data on cost of living come from the Council for Community and
Economic Research. Cost-of-living adjustments include the relative price
differences for groceries, transportation, housing, utilities, health care and
miscellaneous goods and services.
* New York estimate is for cost of living in Manhattan. Figures for Brooklyn
are: $295, $1,968, $3,251 and $3,658. Figures for Queens are: $332, $2,219,
$3,665 and $4,124.

ticularly eroded in the Northeast and along the West Coast.
TABLE 5: COL-ADJUSTED VALUE OF MAX CREDIT IN
REPRESENTATIVE SMALL METROS ($)

City

Number of children
Zero

One

Two

Three

351

2,342

3,868

4,352

Fairbanks, Alaska

375

2,506

4,139

4,657

Flagstaff, Ariz.

446

2,977

4,917

5,532

Chapel Hill, N.C.

451

3,011

4,973

5,596

Bellingham, Wash.

462

3,088

5,101

5,739

Madison, Wis.

478

3,193

5,273

5,933

Stamford, Conn.

Hilton Head, S.C.

470

3,140

5,186

5,835

By Statute

503

3,359

5,548

6,242

Peoria, Ill.

507

3,386

5,592

6,292

Dayton, Ohio

546

3,644

6,019

6,771

Brownsville, Texas

562

3,751

6,196

6,971

Winston-Salem, N.C.

571

3,812

6,296

7,084

Tupelo, Miss.

580

3,870

6,392

7,192

Idaho Falls, Idaho

590

3,939

6,506

7,319

Pueblo, Colo.

605

4,040

6,673

7,508

SOURCE: Data on cost of living come from the Council for Community and
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Economic Research. Cost-of-living adjustments include the relative price
differences for groceries, transportation, housing, utilities, health care and
miscellaneous goods and services.

working poor who live in high-cost areas.

As shown in Table 5, this is not merely a big-city phenomenon. While the real value of the maximum credit in smaller
metros is not eroded as fully as in a place like New York City,
there are many smaller areas where the EITC has a substantially lower real value than what is set nominally by federal
statute. For example, in Stamford, Connecticut, the real value
of the maximum credit is only about 70 percent of what a
recipient in a median cost-of-living city like Peoria, Illinois
receives. On the other end, many smaller metros are substantially less costly than larger metros, providing a boost in the
real value of the maximum credit. In Idaho Falls, Idaho, and
Pueblo, Colorado, the maximum credit has more than $1,000
more purchasing power for a family with three children than
the national limit.

Compounding the problem is that the EITC also is based
on national income limits. A single tax filer qualifies for the
maximum credit with an annual income of $9,880. The credit
begins to phase out at an income of $18,110. And it is completely exhausted at an income of $39,131, regardless of local
incomes and prices in the city where the worker lives. As is
obvious to anyone who has spent much time in Manhattan, a
$40,000 annual salary doesn’t buy much in the city, while the
same wage might be more than enough for a single person to
get by in Tupelo, Mississippi.

Differences in the purchasing power of the maximum credit
mean the EITC is less likely to induce the out-of-work to
look for a job in high-cost cities, especially considering that
many forms of assistance, such Section 8 housing vouchers,
are cost-of-living adjusted. It also means the policy extends
the least help to those potentially in the most need – the

Combining national income limits with differing costs of living effectively produces different real income limits for the
EITC’s availability across metro areas. This generates different labor-market incentives for similar workers in different
metropolitan areas. Consider the income level at which the
credit is completely exhausted – $39,131. That level of nominal income has much less real purchasing power in New York
than it does nationally. Workers with that level of income in

TABLE 6: COL-ADJUSTED EITC INCOME LIMITS IN REPRESENTATIVE LARGE METROS ($)

City

Single
Max credit eligible

Phase out begins

Married
Credit exhausted

Max credit eligible

Phase out begins

Credit exhausted
20,357

New York*

4,504

8,257

17,840

4,504

10,773

San Francisco

6,145

11,264

24,339

6,145

14,698

27,772

Washington

7,086

12,989

28,067

7,086

16,949

32,026

Los Angeles

7,609

13,948

30,137

7,609

18,199

34,389

Philadelphia

8,177

14,988

32,385

8,177

19,556

36,954

Chicago

8,606

15,775

34,085

8,606

20,583

38,893

Denver

9,517

17,445

37,693

9,517

22,762

43,011

By Statute

9,880

18,110

39,131

9,880

23,630

44,651

Houston

10,002

18,334

39,615

10,002

23,922

45,203

Orlando, Fla.

10,287

18,857

40,744

10,287

24,604

46,492

Phoenix

10,335

18,944

40,932

10,335

24,718

46,707

Indianapolis

10,783

19,764

42,705

10,783

25,789

48,730

San Antonio

11,173

20,480

44,253

11,173

26,723

50,495

Columbus, Ohio

11,369

20,838

45,026

11,369

27,190

51,378

Memphis, Tenn.

11,616

21,291

46,005

11,616

27,781

52,494

SOURCE: Council for Community and Economic Research data. Parameters reflect tax filer with one dependent child. Differences for single tax filers and
those with three or more children would be magnified across metros. Differences for tax filers with two children would be similar to those presented above.
* New York estimate is for cost of living in Manhattan
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TABLE 7: COL-ADJUSTED EITC INCOME LIMITS IN REPRESENTATIVE SMALL METROS ($)
Single

Married

City

Max credit
eligible

Phase out
begins

Credit
exhausted

Max credit
eligible

Phase out
begins

Credit
exhausted

Stamford, Conn.

6,888

12,625

27,280

6,888

16,473

31,128

Fairbanks, Alaska

7,371

13,511

29,193

7,371

17,629

33,312

Flagstaff, Ariz.

8,757

16,051

34,682

8,757

20,943

39,574

Chapel Hill, N.C.

8,857

16,235

35,079

8,857

21,183

40,027

Bellingham, Wash.

9,084

16,651

35,979

9,084

21,727

41,055

Madison, Wis.

9,391

17,214

37,194

9,391

22,461

42,441

Hilton Head, S.C.

9,236

16,929

36,580

9,236

22,090

41,740

By Statute

9,880

18,110

39,131

9,880

23,630

44,651

Peoria, Ill.

9,959

18,255

39,444

9,959

23,819

45,008

Dayton, Ohio

10,718

19,646

42,450

10,718

25,634

48,438

Brownsville, Texas

11,034

20,225

43,700

11,034

26,389

49,865

Winston-Salem, N.C.

11,212

20,552

44,408

11,212

26,817

50,673

Tupelo, Miss.

11,384

20,866

45,087

11,384

27,226

51,447

Idaho Falls, Idaho

11,585

21,236

45,885

11,585

27,708

52,358

Pueblo, Colo.

11,884

21,784

47,069

11,884

28,423

53,708

SOURCE: Council for Community and Economic Research data. Parameters reflect tax filer with one dependent child. Differences for single tax filers and
those with three or more children would be magnified across metros. Differences for tax filers with two children would be similar to those presented above.

New York are actually poor, but they get no federal EITC.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the same annual earnings in Columbus, Ohio, translate into $45,000 of purchasing
power, providing a much higher standard of living. Table 6
demonstrates the relative income differences that the EITC
income limits actually produce when considering local cost
of living in several large metropolitan areas. While this is
only a small problem in cities near the median, the EITC
income limits severely dampen the credit’s usefulness in several metros with a large population living in poverty, like Los
Angeles and Washington.
As in the case of the credit maximum, national income limits
are not just a problem for big cities. Table 7 shows several
smaller towns where the national income limit is substantially less in real terms. The drop-off is nearly $10,000 in
Fairbanks, Alaska, and almost $5,000 in Flagstaff, Arizona.
At the same time, low-cost smaller towns get an even bigger
boost from the national income limit. For example, $39,131
of income – set by statute as the level at which the credit is
completely exhausted for a single filer – is equivalent to more
than $47,000 of purchasing power in Pueblo, Colorado, or
more than double the purchasing power enjoyed by a worker
in Stamford, Connecticut.
Tables 6 and 7 show the real income difference induced by the
phase out, which is set nationally at $18,110. Because EITC
income limits are not adjusted for cost of living, workers are

moved into the phase-out range of the credit at significantly
different levels of real income. Workers with equivalent skill
sets, and probably very similar lifestyles, face enormously
different marginal tax rates as the credit is pulled back.
When a worker’s income moves into the phase-out range,
he or she starts to incur the tax of paying back the EITC. This
payback happens at especially low levels of effective income
in high-cost areas, like New York and San Francisco. This
amounts to as much as a 21-percentage-point higher tax rate
for a similar worker in different cities.
From a worker’s perspective, hitting the phase-out region
of the credit can greatly decrease the EITC’s incentive to
work. As the Congressional Budget Office points out in a 2012
study, the phase out of the EITC – along with the loss, as
income increases, of other means-tested anti-poverty programs – creates marginal tax rates in excess of 90 percent for
some workers who earn less than $20,000 annually.5
Economist Casey Mulligan makes the connection that these
high marginal tax rates destroys the incentive to work,
especially for workers with weak attachments to the labor

5. Congressional Budget Office, “Illustrative Examples of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
Faced by Married and Single Taxpayers: Supplemental Material for Effective Marginal
Tax Rates for Low- and Moderate-Income Workers,” November 2012. https://www.
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/43722-Supplemental_
Material-MarginalTaxRates.pdf
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FIGURE 2: HOURS WORKED BEFORE EITC PHASE-OUT ACROSS LARGE METRO AREAS

SOURCE: IRS SOI 2013 data, BLS May 2014 summary file and authors’ calculations. Hours worked calculated based
on average hourly wage for dishwasher workers in metro area.

force.6 Due to local differences in labor-market conditions,
the EITC phase out’s destruction of work incentives does
not affect cities uniformly. Local effects will depend on the
interaction between the national income limit and a given
city’s wage distribution.
To illustrate, take the case of someone with one child working as a dishwasher in different cities. Although this person
is living in poverty by any reasonable definition, as a result
of the EITC’s national income limits, how they are treated
by the tax code will differ depending on their nominal wage,
which has a different value in different local markets. The
dishwasher in Brownsville, Texas who works a standard
2,000-hour year will never hit the EITC phase out. For that
worker, the program maintains its normal incentives to work.
But the same dishwasher in San Francisco will have to start
repaying the EITC after working just 1,700 hours in a year.
That worker’s $10.73 average hourly wage becomes just $8.47
in take-home pay. That’s because the San Francisco worker
will have to repay the EITC, even though he or she is no less
6. Casey Mulligan, The Redistribution Recession: How Labor Market Distortions Contracted the Economy, Oxford University Press, 2012.

poor, in real terms, than his or her Brownsville counterpart.
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate how the EITC phase-out effectively begins at different levels of work hours for equivalent
workers across U.S. cities. The smaller the number of hours
before the phase-out begins, the more disincentive to work
the phase-out tax rate creates. For the modest wages earned
by a customer-service representative, he or she will hit the
phase-out portion of the EITC in all locations. However, this
phase-out begins at less than half of a standard work year in
many high-cost areas. In low-cost areas, it is as much as 50
percent higher.
This is the central problem of the mismatch between the
national income limit and local labor-market conditions –
it pushes equivalent workers with similar living standards
toward the phase-out region of the EITC at vastly different
rates. This problem is exacerbated by differences in local
labor-market regulations, most notably the minimum wage.
Contrast a city that decides to raise its local hourly minimum wage to $15 with one that uses the federal minimum
of $7.25. Workers who are able to maintain employment in
the higher minimum-wage city will nearly all be moved off
the EITC schedule, mitigating any gains they may have had
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FIGURE 3: HOURS WORKED BEFORE EITC PHASE-OUT ACROSS SMALL METRO AREAS

SOURCE: IRS SOI 2013 data, BLS May 2014 summary file and authors’ calculations. Hours worked calculated based on average
hourly wage for dishwasher workers in metro area. Hilton Head metro uses average wage from the Low Country Non Metro
area that covers Beaufort County, which contains Hilton Head. Tupelo metro uses average wage from the Northeast MS Non
Metro area that covers Lee County, which contains Tupelo.

from the wage increase. Those gains may be further eroded
by the fact that high minimum-wage cities also tend to be
high-cost areas and that employers tend to raise prices when
faced with minimum-wage increases.

CONCLUSION: MAKING THE EITC
MORE IMPACTFUL
The benefits of the EITC are well-established. It improves
labor-market opportunities for the working poor, boots
income and is regarded widely as the most effective anti-poverty tool in the federal toolkit. The benefits reach beyond the
labor market, with research showing the credit is responsible
for a wide range of life improvements, such as better health,
improved elementary-school performance and even higher
levels of college attendance. Unfortunately, these gains likely
are confined to areas where national EITC parameters are
generous relative to local wages and costs of living. They may
be nonexistent in high-cost metropolitan areas, where many
of the nation’s poor reside.

credit and national income limits would mean that workers
in similar living situations would be treated equitably – a
dishwasher in Brownsville, Texas would get the same relative benefits from the EITC as a dishwasher in San Francisco.
Adjusting the EITC for local conditions also may help to slow
the migration of working poor families out of expensive cities, allowing them to maintain workplace and family networks without sacrificing quality of life.
To equalize EITC’s labor-market gains across cities and
expand its positive incentive to work, the credit also could
be made more generous overall. We simulate a model (details
contained in Appendix III) that estimates how much the
maximum EITC would need to be increased across metro
areas to induce a 6-percentage-point increase in the laborforce participation of local workers. This simulation considers both the cost-of-living adjustment and the general rise
in benefits. Results for the metro areas covered by our study
are displayed in Table 8. While the increase in the credit that
would be needed to boost labor-force participation is sub-

A simple and effective fix to expand the EITC’s benefits
would be to adjust it for local labor-market and cost-of-living conditions. Adjusting the national maximum allowable
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stantial in high-cost areas and for childless workers, who
currently receive only a small credit, it is much more modest
in low-cost areas and for workers with more children, who
already receive a fairly substantial credit.
TABLE 8: INCREASE IN MAX EITC NEEDED TO RAISE LABORFORCE PARTICIPATION 6 PERCENTAGE POINTS ($)

City

Number of children
Zero

One

Two

Three

New York*

6,387

6,546

6,339

6,201

San Francisco

4,548

4,798

4,647

4,546

Stamford, Conn.

4,003

4,281

4,146

4,056

Washington

3,877

4,161

4,029

3,942

Fairbanks, Alaska

3,708

4,000

3,874

3,790

Los Angeles

3,576

3,875

3,753

3,671

Philadelphia

3,293

3,606

3,492

3,416

Chicago

3,103

3,426

3,318

3,246

Flagstaff, Ariz.

3,041

3,367

3,261

3,190

Chapel Hill, N.C.

3,001

3,329

3,224

3,154

Bellingham, Wash.

2,914

3,246

3,143

3,075

Hilton Head, S.C.

2,857

3,192

3,092

3,024

Madison, Wis.

2,802

3,140

3,041

2,974

Denver, Colo.

2,758

3,098

3,000

2,935

Peoria, Ill.

2,613

2,961

2,867

2,805

Houston, Texas

2,600

2,948

2,855

2,793

Orlando, Fla.

2,514

2,866

2,776

2,715

Phoenix, Ariz.

2,500

2,853

2,763

2,703

Dayton, Ohio

2,393

2,751

2,664

2,606

Indianapolis

2,375

2,735

2,648

2,591

Brownsville, Texas

2,310

2,672

2,588

2,532

San Antonio

2,275

2,639

2,556

2,500

Winston-Salem, N.C.

2,265

2,630

2,547

2,491

Columbus, Ohio

2,227

2,594

2,512

2,457

Tupelo, Miss.

2,223

2,590

2,508

2,454

Idaho Falls, Idaho

2,176

2,545

2,465

2,411

Memphis, Tenn.

2,169

2,538

2,458

2,405

Pueblo, Colo.

2,109

2,481

2,403

2,350

same labor-market gains as $11,887 in New York. Offering the
standard national rate prompts basically no response in New
York, while inducing a large change in Tupelo. From a practical standpoint, the Internal Revenue Service already collects
all of the necessary data to determine the proper cost-ofliving adjustment needed to equalize EITC payments.
Beyond making geographic adjustments to the EITC, other
changes could be made to the tax break to increase its usefulness as a labor-market intervention. First and foremost,
the phase-out schedule could be reconfigured to use a lower
rate, a change that would remove the current disincentive for
additional work. Second, payroll data could be used to dispense EITC payments more regularly, as workers currently
receive the benefit in a lump sum once per year. This change
could heighten the labor-market response and reduce unnecessary and expensive borrowing by recipients. Lastly, policymakers should consider how the EITC interacts with both
federal and state minimum-wage policies. Minimum wages
effectively make the EITC less effective as a means to expand
job opportunities for the less fortunate. In the extreme, they
could push some EITC recipients into the phase-out region
or completely off the credit, curbing any perceived gains.

Source: Data on cost of living come from the Council for Community and
Economic Research. Cost-of-living adjustments include the relative price
difference for groceries, transportation, housing, utilities, health care and
miscellaneous goods and services.
* New York estimate is for cost of living in Manhattan.

This exercise also shows that, while expanding the EITC
would be expensive, targeting funding based on cost of living can provide a more even distribution of the policy’s labormarket gains. This simulation shows that, from a federal
standpoint, $8,056 in Tupelo, Mississippi will buy you the
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APPENDIX II: COST-OF-LIVING CALCULATION

APPENDIX I: CROSS-SECTION REGRESSION
MODEL OF EITC CLAIM RATES
This model examines differences in EITC claim rates (the
dependent variable) using differences in local cost of living,
poverty, employment and demographics (the independent
variables). The basic model uses cross-section regression
analysis to determine what factors are related to EITC claim
differences. Cross-section regression allows for multiple factors to be examined simultaneously, but does not allow for
a clear causal relationship between these factors and EITC
claim rates to be determined. The model should be viewed as
determining if the set of factors we examine share a relationship with EITC claim rates, holding other factors constant.
The basic model is:
Ln (EITC Claim Rate) = α + β 1 (Ln(CLI)) + β 2 (Ln(Pov))
+ β3 (Ln(Emp)) + β4 (Ln(F.Size)) + ε
Where CLI is the cost-of-living value for each metro, measured in an index with a median of 100; Pov is the percentage
of residents living in poverty; Emp is the employment rate;
and F.Size is the average number of persons per household.
All variables are transformed using natural logs, so the interpretation of each output coefficient (β) is an elasticity. Each
β estimate shows what percentage EITC claim rate change
is related to a given percentage change in the corresponding
variable. For example, a β3 value of 0.5 would be interpreted
as a 10 percent rise in employment being related to a 5 percent rise in the EITC claim rate.
We estimate the model using data on a cross section of 251
metropolitan areas where we have data on all four factors.
All data are from the year 2013. Cost-of-living data are taken
from the Council for Community and Economic Research
database, as described in Appendix II. EITC claim rate data
come from the IRS Statistics of Income ZIP-code-level files
and are aggregated to the metropolitan area using ArcGIS
software. Poverty, employment and family-size data come
from U.C. Census estimates, using survey data from the
American Community Survey.
The results of the model are:
TABLE 9: RESULTS OF CROSS-SECTION REGRESSION MODEL OF
EITC CLAIM RATES
lneitc

Estimate

Std. Err.

t

P>t

[95% Conf. Int.]

Ln (CLI) β1

-0.75139

0.090124

-8.34

0.00

-0.92891

-0.57388

Ln (Pov) β2

0.370661

0.042414

8.74

0.00

0.287121

0.454201

Ln (Emp) β3

-0.85731

0.103643

-8.27

0.00

-1.06145

-0.65317

Ln (F. Size) β4

1.303222

0.113997

11.43

0.00

1.078687

1.527757

α

7.628794

0.674328

11.31

0.00

6.300601

8.956987

Cost-of-living data for metropolitan areas come from the
Council for Community and Economic Research. We use
their 100 percent composite index from the annual aggregation for the year 2013. The data are aggregated from localarea chambers of commerce, based on voluntary participation. The composite index uses the following weights for
cost-of-living components (note that rounding to the second decimal results in a summed total value of 100.01, rather
than 100):
• Grocery items: 13.48 percent
• Housing: 26.05 percent
• Utilities: 9.95 percent
• Transportation: 12.63 percent
• Health care: 4.89 percent
• Miscellaneous goods and services: 33.01 percent
Housing costs are based on rents, home prices and mortgageinterest rates. Health-care costs are based on doctor, dentist, optometrist and some drug prices. Utilities costs include
energy costs and phone costs. Transportation costs include
gasoline and some auto repair. Grocery items and miscellaneous goods contain a wide range of items, from bread
to tennis balls. Within each category, items are assigned a
weight based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer
Expenditure Survey.
The composite index is calculated to assign a value of 100 to
the median cost-of-living area, with higher scores for relatively higher cost-of-living areas and lower scores for lower
cost-of-living areas. The magnitude of the difference in cost
of living is consistent with the difference between 100 and
the metro area score, regardless whether one moves up or
down the scale.

APPENDIX III: EITC-INDUCED LABOR-MARKET
CHANGES
Estimates from a 1996 paper by Nada Eissa and Jeffrey
Liebman show that a $1,186 increase in the maximum EITC
results in a 2.8-percentage-point increase in labor-force
participation.7 More recently, Katie Fitzpatrick and Jeffrey
Thompson showed that, for every $1,000 increase in the local
cost of living, the labor-force participation increase from the
EITC falls by 1 percentage point.8

7. Nada Eissa and Jeffrey Liebman, “Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income
Tax Credit,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(2): 605–637, 1996.
8. Katie Fitzpatrick and Jeffrey Thompson, “The Interaction of metropolitan costof-living and the Federal Earned Income Tax Credit: One Size Fits All?” National Tax
Journal, 63(3): 419–446, 2010.
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We use these estimates and the cost-of-living data to create
an estimate of the relative adjustment that would be needed
for the current EITC to induce a 6-percentage-point increase
in labor-force participation. We chose 6 percentage points as
our outcome because current labor-force participation rates
among women between 25 and 54 are about 74 percent, and
most EITC recipients are single mothers. A change of 6 percentage points would bring the rate in line with the population rate for that age range (80 percent). Our calculation also
considers that the EITC becomes marginally less effective
at inducing labor-force participation as earnings increase,
so that a larger credit is needed to move the labor-forceparticipation rate 1 percentage point from a larger base. Our
equation for the size EITC needed for a 6-percentage-point
change in labor-force participation is:
New Max Credit = Current Max + Ci *

(I+P)
Eg
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Where I, P, Ci and Eg come from the following equations:
I = LFP Increase 2.8*1,186
P = 100 * LFP Increase
Ci =
Eg=

Index
100

1
Labor Elasticity

Where I is the unadjusted-dollar increase in maximum EITC
credit that would increase the labor-force-participation
rate by 6 percentage points; P is the penalty added to this
amount, which increases as larger labor-force inducements
are desired; and Ci adjusts the amount appropriately for local
cost of living. Finally, Eg adjusts for the relative difference in
labor-supply elasticities between single workers and those
with increasing numbers of dependent children.
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